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Are the properties of communicative acts grounded in the intentions with 
which they are performed, or in the conventions that govern them? The 
latest round in this debate has been sparked by Ernie Lepore and Mat-
thew Stone (2015), who argue that much more of communication is con-
ventional than we thought, and that the rest isn’t really communication 
after all, but merely the initiation of open-ended imaginative thought. I 
argue that although Lepore and Stone may be right about many of the 
specifi c cases they discuss, their big-picture, conventionalist conclusions 
don’t follow. My argument focuses on four phenomena that present chal-
lenges to conventionalist accounts of communication: ambiguity, indi-
rect communication, communication by wholly unconventional means, 
and convention acquisition.
Keywords: Communication, convention, intentionalism, Grice, in-
direct speech acts.
Introduction
To what extent is communication a matter of convention, and to what 
extent is it a matter of hearers recognizing the intentions of speakers? 
This has been one of the central questions in the contemporary philoso-
phy of language since J. L. Austin and H. P. Grice began debating it in 
Oxford in the 1940’s.
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Recently, the conventionalist fl ame has been stoked with new fuel 
from linguistics, and the new conventionalism that has emerged as a 
result has found its most ambitious and philosophically sophisticated 
expression in Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone’s new book, Imagination 
and Convention: Distinguishing Grammar and Inference in Language. 
On the strength of innovations from dynamic semantics, coherence the-
ory, and formal pragmatics, Lepore and Stone argue that many aspects 
of communication that have standardly been taken to involve Gricean 
mechanisms are actually governed by linguistic conventions that had 
previously escaped notice.
As for the rest of the supposedly inferential parts of communication—
the parts that can’t be given conventionalist treatments: Lepore and 
Stone argue that they shouldn’t be understood as aspects of communica-
tion at all. Instead, they are ways in which we engage our hearers in 
imaginative thought that needn’t have any single goal.
Lepore and Stone’s squeeze play is the most comprehensive at-
tack on Gricean approaches to lan guage and communication in decades. 
They must be stopped! In this paper, I therefore won’t focus on their 
detailed analyses of particular examples. Instead, I’ll try to show that 
these analyses don’t add up to convincing defense of their sweeping 
conclusions about the nature of communication.
Here’s the plan. In §1, I formulate the disagreement between con-
ventionalism and intentionalism as precisely as I can. In §2, I draw 
a distinction between two kinds of cognitive process involved in com-
munication, and show how this distinction bears on the conventional-
ism–intentionalism debate in a way that can allow us to adjudicate it. 
Namely: although conventional properties of communicative acts can 
be interpreted by wholly algorithmic processes, intention-based proper-
ties have to be interpreted by inferential processes. In §§3–6, I discuss 
four phenomena, in order of increasing trickiness for Lepore and Stone, 
that force hearers to rely on inferential processes, and that therefore 
threaten conventionalism: ambiguity, indirect communication, wholly 
unconventional utterances, and the acquisition of new conventions. Al-
though Lepore and Stone have things to say about how conventionalists 
can handle each of these phenomena, I’ll conclude by arguing that it 
doesn’t make sense to say all of these things at once.
1. Conventionalism and In tentionalism
Conventionalism is the idea that communicative acts are, essentially, 
things we do by behaving in conformity to conventions. Intentional-
ism is the view that communicative acts are, essentially, things we do 
by acting with certain intentions. By ‘communicative acts’, I mean the 
things that speakers do, and that their addressees have to correctly in-
terpret, in order for communication to take place. I am using the term 
‘speaker’ quite loosely here, since communication needn’t involve speech, 
or even language; it can also transpire by means of “utterances” that 
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are written, signed, gestured, displayed, or made available to the ad-
dressee in any number of other modalities. What is at issue between 
conventionalists and intentionalists is whether these utterances serve 
as the vehicles of communicative acts primarily in virtue of the con-
ventions that govern them, or primarily in virtue of the intentions with 
which they’re produced.1
In order to formulate the terms of the debate with more precision, 
let’s begin by distinguishing two kinds of questions that we can ask 
about the properties of communicative acts. Specifi cally, suppose that 
we are interested in some property ϕ of a communicative act α, such that 
the α’s addressee must interpret α as having ϕ in order for communica-
tion to succeed. Any given communicative act has many such proper-
ties. Suppose, for example, that a speaker performs a literal and direct 
speech act by uttering (1).
(1) He should be turning a profi t by now.
In order to correctly interpret the communicative act performed with 
(1), let us suppose that an addressee will have to interpret the speaker 
as performing an assertion (rather than a question), as referring to Jeff 
Bezos (rather than Santa Claus) with ‘he’, and as making an epistemic 
claim (rather than a deontic claim) with the modal ‘should’. Each of 
these properties of the speaker’s communicative act, as well as various 
other properties, is a possible value for ϕ, in the way I have set things up.2 
We can now formulate the guiding questions of our inquiry as follows:
 Guiding Questions
 Where α is a communicative act with a property ϕ such that α’s 
addressee would have to interpret α as having ϕ in order for com-
munication to succeed:
1 It is worth noting that there are also positi ons about the nature of communicative 
acts that aren’t species of either conventionalism or intentionalism. One example is 
Timothy Williamson’s (2000) idea that an assertion is constituted by the fact that 
it is subject to the knowledge norm (it’s unclear what Williamson thinks about 
other communicative acts). Another example is Wilfrid Sellars’ (1954) idea that the 
properties of communicative acts, like the properties of intentional mental states, boil 
down to their conceptual roles. Another example is Robert Brandom’s idea (1994), 
extended by Mark Lance and Rebecca Kukla (2009), that facts about communicative 
acts boil down to normative facts about how discourse may or ought to proceed. In 
order to focus on the debate between conventionalism and intentionalism, I will here 
pretend that these and other nonconventionalist, non-intentionalist alternatives are 
not live options. 
2 There is a further question about what interpreting a speech act as having a 
given property consists in. Interpreting an act as an assertion needn’t consist in 
coming to believe that the speaker has performed an assertion, for example. The 
concept of assertion may best be understood as a theoretical concept that needn’t 
be possessed by competent communicators, after all. On the simplest version 
of intentionalism, to recognize that someone has asserted p is just to recognize 
that they performed it with the intention of getting their addressee to believe p. 
Conventionalists are free to tell their own story about what interpreting a speech act 
as having a certain property consists  in.
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(MQ)  THE METAPHYSICAL QUESTION 
In virtue of what does α have ϕ?
(EQ) THE EPISTEMIC QUESTION
How can a hearer come to recognize that α has ϕ?
These two questions demand answers of different kinds. A theory that 
answers instances of (MQ) is a metaphysical theory of what constitutes 
or grounds the properties of communicative acts that play a role in the 
theory of communication. A theory that answers instances (EQ) is a 
psychological theory about the kinds of information and cognitive pro-
cesses that hearers use to interpret speech acts.3
The disagreement between conventionalism and intentionalism is 
primarily about (MQ), but, as I’ll argue below, how we answer (EQ) 
about particular values for ϕ can have implications for how we can an-
swer (MQ) for those same values, and much of this essay will deal with 
the relationship between the two. But fi rst let me focus on (MQ), which 
the most extreme versions of conventionalism and intentionalism will 
answer, respectively, as follows:
(TC) Total Conventionalism
 For any property ϕ and communicative act α such that α’s ad-
dressee would have to interpret α as having ϕ in order for com-
munication to succeed, α has ϕ in virtue of facts about the conven-
tions that govern the utterance-type with which α was performed 
in the language in which α was performed.
(TI) Total Intentionalism
 For any property ϕ and communicative act α such that α’s ad-
dressee would have to interpret α as having ϕ in order for commu-
nication to succeed, α has ϕ in virtue of facts about the intentions 
with which α was performed.
Since it’s possible for the debate to play out in different ways with respect 
to different kinds of values for ϕ, there is really a spectrum of positions 
between (TC) and (TI). For example, a number of authors have defended 
versions of the view that the content of a context-sensitive expression 
on an occasion of use is fi xed by facts about speakers’ intentions on that 
occasion (Bach 1987, 1992; Kaplan; 1989; King, 2013, 2014), while leav-
ing open the possibility that other properties of communicative acts are 
fi xed by convention. Nonetheless, as I interpret Lepore and Stone, they 
occupy a position at or very near the total-conventionalist end of the 
spectrum. My own view lies at the total-intentionalist end of the spec-
trum, though I won’t try to defend total intentionalism in this essay.
How can we adjudicate between conventionalism and intentional-
ism about particular properties of communicative acts? The answer 
3 The importance of this distinction has been vigorously advocated by Stephen 
Neale (2004; 2005; 2016), who argues that the confl ation of metaphysical and 
epistemic questions about communication is the source of much confusion in 
contemporary semantics and pragmatics.
 D.W. Harris, Intentionalism versus The New Conventionalism 177
depends on the nature of conventions—an issue on which Lepore and 
Stone defer to David Lewis (1969; 1975).
A convention, according to Lewis, is a kind of self-sustaining solution 
to a coordination problem. A coordination problem arises when it would 
benefi t the agents in a group to perform actions of a certain kind in the 
same way, but there are various good candidate ways to choose from. In 
a situation like this, each of the agents’ interests would be best served 
if the community arbitrarily settles on one way of performing actions 
of the kind in question, and sticks to it. A textbook example is the 
choice of which side of the road to drive on: each of us is better off 
if we all consistently drive only one side, but it doesn’t really matter 
which. Different populations have adopted different conventions to solve 
the problem.4
Clearly, some aspects of how we use language are conventional in 
at least this sense. Although English-speakers use the word ‘science’ 
to talk about science, we could just as well have used ‘Wissenschaft’ 
instead. One of Lepore and Stone’s main argumentative strategies is to 
point to a wide variety of other facts about the ways in which we speak 
that, contrary to what many have thought, are likewise arbitrary, and so 
conventional, in this sense. I will address these arguments in §4.
2. Algorithm and Inference
We also need to think about (EQ)—the epistemic question to be an-
swered by a psychological theory of the processes by which hear ers in-
terpret the properties of communicative acts. Specifi cally, I want to fo-
cus on the distinction between cognitive processes that are algorithmic 
and those that are inferential.
By an algorithmic process, I mean one that draws on an encapsu-
lated body of information and that can be fi nitely axiomatized. A para-
digmatically algorithmic cognitive process is syntactic parsing—the 
task of assigning syntactic structures to linguistic perceptual inputs. 
Although much work remains to be done, phonologists, morphologists, 
and syntacticians have made impressive progress toward formulating 
4 Lepore and Stone also go along with Lewis’s particular account of the metaphysics 
of conventions, according to which the members of a group G participate in a conve ntion 
of ϕing by ψing just in case it is common knowledge among members of G that they 
truly believe that they regularly ϕ by ψing, that they generally prefer to ϕ by ψing (as 
opposed to ϕing by other means), that their beliefs about this regularity gives them a 
reason to continue it, and that there is at least one other way of ϕing that would have 
served their purposes just as well (Lewis 1975). Lewis’s theory of convention has been 
criticized along various lines, many of which I think are decisive (Burge 1975; Gilbert 
1989; Harris 2014; Hawthorne 1990, 1993; Hawthorne and Magidor 2009; Millikan 
1998, 2005; Petit 2002; Schiffer 1993; Skyrms 1996, 2010). Still, the major positive 
theories proposed as alternatives to Lewis’s theory can still be thought of as theories of 
either what causes solutions to coordinations to arise and persist (Millikan 1998, 2005; 
Skyrms 1996, 2010), or as theories of what grounds solutions to coordination problems 
(Gilbert 1989; Harris 2014; Miller 2001; Schiffer 1993).
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the body of information on which parsing relies, and psycholinguists 
have built impressive computational models of the processes by which 
these principles are acquired and deployed in parsing. All of this is 
possible because the parser is, at least for the most part, a discrete and 
limited component of the mind: it takes a certain class of inputs and 
algorithmically transforms them into outputs in a way that is largely 
insensitive to the agent’s personal-level mental states.
By contrast, inferential processes are, to borrow terminology from 
Jerry Fodor, isotropic. In spelling out what this property amount to, 
Fodor uses scientifi c confi rmation as a case study, since he thinks that 
it is a good model for isotropic cognitive processes, such as analogical 
reasoning, belief fi xation, and inference to the best explanation (a.k.a., 
abduction).
By saying that confi rmation is isotropic, I mean that the facts relevant to 
the confi rmation of a scientifi c hypothesis may be drawn from anywhere 
in the fi eld of previously established empirical (or, of course, demonstra-
tive) truths. Crudely: everything that the scientist knows is, in principle, 
relevant to determining what else he ought to believe. In principle , our 
botany constrains our astronomy, if only we could think of ways to make 
them connect. […]
These generalizations about cognitive architecture connect up to the con-
ventionalism–intentionalism debate by way of the following principle: 
wholly conventional properties of communicative acts can be interpret-
ed by wholly algorithmic decoding processes, whereas intention-based 
properties of communicative acts can be interpreted only by processes 
that are, at least partly, inferential. If we can show that inferential pro-
cesses are needed to interpret a communicative act as having a property 
of a certain kind, therefore, we will have shown that conventionalism is 
false about properties of that kind.
The argument for the convention-algorithm link goes as follows. Be-
cause conventions are arbitrary, it must be possible for agents to be-
come competent participants in them, whatever that entails, in a fi nite 
amount of time. I will call the process of becoming a competent par-
ticipant in a convention ‘convention acquisition’. It follows from their 
acquirability that conventions must be fi nitely axiomatizable: in order 
to become a competent participant in a convention in a fi nite amount 
of time, there must be a fi nite amount of convention to acquire.5 But 
if a convention is fi nitely axiomatizable, then it can be interpreted by 
an algorithmic process that draws on an encapsulated body of informa-
tion—namely, the axioms, or some equivalent body of information.
This link holds even in the case of linguistic conventions, which are 
extremely complex. We can take linguistic conventions to be pairings of 
5 This is a  generalization of Davidson’s argument for the conclusion that a 
semantic theory must be fi nitely axiomatizable (Davidson 1965). It is generalized in 
two ways: (i) it applies to conventions generally, and not just linguistic conventions, 
and (ii) I don’t assume that acquiring a convention is a matter of coming  to know 
anything, or of entering into any other personal-level mental states.
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types of communicative acts with the types of observable utterances by 
means of which they can be literally performed.6 Because languages are 
productive—they contain an indefi nitely large number of conventionally 
meaningful expressions, many of which have never before been uttered—
linguistic conventions must be spelled out by means of a grammar, which 
is a set of principles that together entail a pairing of utterancetypes and 
communicative-act types. A grammar can thus be thought of as a fi nite 
specifi cation of the conventions governing a language. Within genera-
tive linguistics, it is also common to use the word ‘grammar’ to refer to 
the body information a speaker must come to in order to be a competent 
speaker of a language, and on which the algorithmic component of their 
language production and interpretation mechanisms draw.
The fact that intention-based properties must be interpreted by in-
ferential processes follows from the fact that recognizing someone’s in-
tentions is an application of mindreading—the process of attributing 
propositional attitudes to others— together with the fact that mind-
reading is a paradigmatically isotropic process. There are no norma-
tive or practical limitations on the information that I might draw on 
in order to fi gure out your beliefs and intentions. If interpreting your 
communicative act as having a certain property is a matter of recogniz-
ing your intentions, it follows that doing so is an isotropic, and therefore 
inferential, process.
The connection between inference, mindreading, and interpreting 
communicative acts lies at the core of intentionalist ideas about com-
munication. Here is Stephen Neale making a concise case for these 
connections, for example.
To interpret is to provide an explanation, and the concept of interpretation 
makes no sense in the absence of a problem to be solved. We refl exively gen-
erate hypotheses about the things we perceive. Nowhere is this more in evi-
dence than when we perceive one another’s actions. We act out of reasons. 
To interpret an action is to form a hypothesis about the intentions behind 
it, the intentions that explain it. Interpreting a speec h act is a special case 
 of this. (Neale 2005: 179)
I agree with Neale that interpreting a communicative act is always and 
essentially a matter of explaining the speaker’s utterance by inferring 
their intentions. Although some of the processes involved in the inter-
pretation of some communicative acts are algorithmic and grammar-
driven, other communicative acts cannot be interpreted even in part 
by means of algorithmic processes. (I’ll make the case for this claim in 
§5.) Moreover, the algorithmic processes involved in interpreting even 
highly explicit, linguistic communicative acts serve only to narrow 
down the range of possible interpretations; the rest of interpretation 
6 Total conventionalism can be understood as the view that the linguistic 
conventions governing an utterance-type fully specify the properties of a 
communicative act that a hearer would have to interpret it as having in order for 
communication to succeed.
180 D.W. Harris, Intentionalism versus The New Conventionalism
must be inferential. (I won’t make the case for this view here, though I 
will chip away at the alternative view.)
In the next four sections, I will consider four kinds of objection to 
conventionalism about various properties of communicative acts and, so, 
to total conventionalism of the sort advocated by Lepore and Stone. 
Each of these objections revolves around a task involved in interpret-
ing run-of-the-mill communicative acts that looks to be inferential, and 
so seems to present Lepore and Stone with counterexamples.
3. Ambiguity
First, consider the problem raised by ambiguous sentences.
(2) I forgot how good beer tastes.
(3) I saw her duck under the table. (Perry 1997: 593)
Each of these sentences has more than one literal meaning, which is to 
say that it is governed by at least two distinct linguistic conventions. To 
interpret a literal and direct communicative act performed with one of 
the sentences requires fi guring out which convention is operative.
It is easy to see that choosing between confl icting conventions is 
an inferential task. In order to understand someone who utters (2), for 
example, it might help to know whether they’ve spent the last several 
years going to AA meetings or merely a bar with nothing but Bud Light 
on tap. But to know that, it might help to know whether alcoholism 
runs in their family, whether they have ever used the phrase, ‘fake it 
til you make it’, an d whether they belong to a fratern ity. In short: who 
knows what sorts of information might be relevant to disambiguating 
(2)? Likewise for  (3): was the utterance made by someone who hangs 
out with animal lovers, or by a school teacher in 1953 who has been run-
ning her students through nuclear drills? You get the point: disambigua-
tion is inferential. In fact, Lepore and Stone accept this (2015: 12). How, 
then, can they be conventionalists?
The answer, I think, is that disambiguation is the only inferential 
process that Lepore and Stone take to be involved in interpreting genu-
ine communicative acts. And the fact that interpretation often involves 
disambiguation does not threaten conventionalism, for the following 
reason: insofar as disambiguation involves inferring the speaker’s in-
tentions, the intention at issue is merely the intention to make use 
of a certain convention. It’s this convention, chosen by the speaker and 
inferred by the hearer, that does the work of fi xing the properties of 
the communicative act. Once the relevant convention is inferred, the 
rest of interpretation is just an algorithmic process, guided by grammar. 
As Lepore and Stone sometimes put it, “Pragmatics can be, at most, a 
theory of disambiguation; pragmatic reasoning never contributes con-
tent to utterances” (2015: 83).
Recategorizing many of the inferential processes involved in inter-
pretation as varieties of disambiguation is one of the main strategies 
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that Lepore and Stone deploy to defend conventionalism throughout the 
book. Is it a legitimate maneuver? I confess that the difference between 
disambiguation and “pragmatic reasoning” that “contributes content 
to utterances” strikes me as a somewhat tenuous one, particularly as 
more and more inference gets labeled ‘disambiguation’. I’ll return to 
this point.
I also worry that Lepore and Stone’s talk of “pragmatic inference 
contributing content to utterances” risks confl ating the epistemic ques-
tion (EQ) with the metaphysical question (MQ) in a way that obscures 
a problem with their view. Pragmatic reasoning can be part of a theory 
of how hearers interpret communicative acts, but it presumably can’t 
be a theory of what makes it the case that communicative acts have 
the properties they do. For that, we must look to that which pragmatic 
reasoning is aimed at recognizing—namely, the speaker’s intentions. In 
particular, I see no alternative to the view that, when a speaker uses 
an ambiguous expression, the fact that one convention rather than 
another is operative in their communicative act is grounded in their 
intentions. So even if the only role for inference in interpretation is 
disambiguation, that still points to a role for the speaker’s intentions 
in an answer to (MQ), since even if all of the relevant properties of a 
communicative act performed with an ambiguous sentence are fi xed by 
the operative convention, the fact that a given convention is operative 
is fi xed by the speaker’s intention. Lepore and Stone might concede this 
point, but I will argue in §4.3 and §6 that doing so creates serious dif-
fi culties for them.
4. Indirect Communication
Probably the most obvious objection to conventionalism revolves around 
indirect communicative acts, such as the ones that would naturally be 
performed by uttering the following sentences:7
(4) Can I have the french toast?⇝ Serve me the french toast.
(5) Oil prices doubled and demand for consumer goods plunged.⇝ The doubling preceded/caused the plunge.
(6) Well, it loo ked red. [said of a magician’s handkerchief]⇝ I doubt that it is actually red.
How do we communicate indirect meanings like those indicated under 
(4)–(6)? The traditional and still-dominant story draws on Grice’s theory 
of conversational implicature. According to this theory, speakers and in-
terpreters operate under the assumption that, in communicating, they’re 
engaged in a cooperative endeavor—one that is governed by the Coop-
erative Principle and maxims of conversation. Given this assumption, if 
7 I use the symbol ⇝ to indicate a paraphrase of the most natural indirect 
meaning.
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a speaker produces an utterance that would constitute an uncooperative 
contribution to the conversation if taken literally, an interpreter will as-
sume that the utterance meant to be taken non-literally, and will search 
for an alternative, indirect interpretation. The fact that the speaker has 
implicated thusand-such—or, more broadly, that they have performed 
an indirect communicative act of thus-and-such kind8—is, according to 
Grice, “what has to be supposed in order to preserve the supposition that 
the Cooperative Principle is being observed” (1989: 39–40).
In the stereotypical circumstances in which a speaker would utter 
(4), for example, it would be an uncooperative waste of everyone’s time 
for the speaker to merely ask whether they can have the french toast. 
They already know that french toast is available, since they’ve presum-
ably looked at the menu (their use of the defi nite article further signals 
this assumption), and, presumably, they are talking to a waiter, whose 
job it is to get them whatever food they choose. So, on the assumption 
that they’re being cooperative, asking about the availability of French 
toast can’t be all they’re doing by uttering (4). Given the circumstances, 
the obvious further explana tion of why they uttered (4) would be that 
they are trying to get the waiter to bring them some french toast. This 
is the best explanation of why they produced the utterance that they 
did, given the circumstances.
Both coming to recognize that an utterance shouldn’t be taken at 
face value and working out the correct indirect interpretation are, ac-
cording to Grice’s picture, inferential processes. Depending on factors 
that can’t be exhaustively predicted, the most natural interpretations 
of some utterances of (4)–(6) could, in some circumstances, turn out to 
be the literal ones after all. For example: sometimes it might be clear 
that a speaker who utters (4) just wants to know what is on the menu. 
In other cases (4)–(6) might be used to perform indirect communicative 
acts entirely different than those listed. In response to a confi dent asser-
tion that the magician’s handkerchief was not red, for example, (6) could 
be used to implicate that the speaker thinks it was red, or might have 
been. These interpretations depend, in messy and unpredictable ways, 
on what hearers can work out about speakers’ intentions on particular 
occasions of utterance.
It follows from this theory that indirect communicative acts have 
several special properties that can be used as diagnostics. One is that 
they are cancellable, which is to say that a speaker can always follow 
8 Although Grice makes it clear that he thinks that his theory of implicature 
can be extended to explain non-assertoric indirect communicative acts, and t hat, 
in particular, the maxims of quality and q uantity can be generalized to apply acts 
that aren’t true and don’t aim to inform (1989: 28), he does not work out the details 
of such an account. Since it is awkward to talk about someone implicating that q by 
saying that p when what they’ve done is indirectly requested something by asking 
a question, I speak more broadly of indirect communicative acts, and assume that a 
generalized Gricean account could handle them just as well as it handles standard 
cases of implicature.
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up an utterance by which they seem to have conversationally impli-
cated p by clarifying that not-p. There’s nothing incoherent about say-
ing ‘Can I have some toast? I don’t want any, I’m just wondering if it’s 
available’, for example, or ‘Oil prices doubled and demand for consumer 
goods plunged, but not in that order’. This distinguishes the content 
and force of indirect communicative acts from conventional properties 
of direct communicative acts, which can’t be cancelled. (It is incoherent 
to follow (5) with ‘but oil prices haven’t doubled’, for example.) The ex-
planation is clear: the best explanation of an action, including an utter-
ance, needn’t remain the best explanation once new evidence becomes 
available. Suppose I get up and walk toward the kitchen, for example. 
You might conclude that my action is best explained by the hypothesis 
that I intend to get a snack. But suppose you then see me walk straight 
through the kitchen without stopping, and head toward the bathroom. 
In light of this new evidence, your best explanation of my original ac-
tion will change. Cancellation works in the same way: even if your ini-
tial best explanation of my utterance was that I indirectly meant q, this 
explanation is defeasible in light of new evidence, and, unless you have 
reason to think that my cancellation is disingenuous, what better way 
to defeat the conclusion that I meant q than to say that I didn’t, thereby 
forcing you to look for a new explanation?
A second property that Grice attributes to indirect communicative 
acts is that they are calculable.
…the presence of a conversational implicature must be capable of being 
worked out; for even it if can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intu-
ition is replaceable by an argument, the implicature (if present at all) will not 
count as a conversational implicature; it will be a conventional implicature. 
(Grice 1989: 31)
Lepore and Stone say some strange things about Grice’s calculability 
requirement. Here, for example, is a passage in which they criticize 
Gricean pragmatics, seemingly on the ground that it attributes insuf-
fi cient isotropy to the processes by which hearers interpret indirect com-
municative acts.
The Cooperative Principle might be a useful way of thinking about the back-
ground constraints that inform all of this intention recognition. But Grice’s 
theory of conversational implicature calls for more than just recognizing the 
speaker’s intention according to the Cooperative Principle. It requires the 
content of the implicature to come directly from your social understanding of 
the speaker, and not from any of the rest of the rich background that informs 
intention recognition. (2015: 230)
But Grice places no restrictions on the information that hearers can 
draw on in interpreting either indirect or direct communicative acts. 
With regard to implicature, Grice makes this clear immediately after 
outlining the calculability requirement, in a passage that Lepore and 
Stone quote, in full, twice:
To work out that a particular conversational implicature is present, the 
hearer will rely on the following data; (1) the conventional meaning of the 
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words used together with the identity of any references that may be involved; 
(2) the cooperative principle and its maxims; (3) the context, linguistic or oth-
erwise, of the utterance; (4) other items of background knowledge and (5) 
the fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous 
headings are available to both participants and both participants know or 
assume this to be the case. (1989: 31; emphasis added)
Lepore and Stone go on to argue that “Most of Grice’s alleged derivations 
of conversational implicatures fall far short of establishing that the 
implicated meaning is calculated the way Grice’s theory calls for” (2015: 
230). The implication here seems to be that calculability is a very strong 
requirement—that the inferences by which implicatures are worked out 
must be gapless and demonstrative—whereas Grice’s examples of cal-
culations are sloppy and fi lled with gaps. Lepore and Stone seem to 
confi rm this reading earlier in their book, where they admit that they 
“interpret these passages [on calculability] rather more stringently than 
other commentators sometimes do (Lepore and Stone 2015: 22). Lepore 
and Stone are of course right that Grice’s “derivations” of conversational 
implicatures are gappy. But I fail to see why this constitutes a problem 
for Grice’s theory. As Fodor has taught us, inferential psychological 
processes are not subject to precise computational modeling. And in 
saying that implicatures must be calculable—that they must, in his 
words, “be capable of being worked out”—Grice was insisting only that 
implicatures must be interpreted by means of an inferential process 
that draws on, along with whatever other information is available, the 
fact that the speaker said (or made as if to say) thus-and-such, together 
with the assumption that they were being cooperative.
A fi nal quality of at least most indirect communicative acts is, ac-
cording to Grice, that they are nondetachable, which is to say that two 
equally good ways of performing (or making as if to perform) a direct 
communicative act on a given occasion will also be equally good ways of 
performing the same indirect communicative act(s) on that occasion. If I 
would be understood as implicating q by saying p with one sentence, for 
example, then saying p with a different sentence should be an equally 
good way to implicate q.
Like cancellability and calculability, nondetachability follows from 
the fact that the content and force of an indirect communicative act 
aren’t matters of convention. If they were, then there should be no 
reason why two different sentences that could be used to say that p 
would also be equally good ways to implicate the same things, since the 
conventions governing the sentences’ potentials for indirect communica-
tion could differ in arbitrary ways.
All of these considerations have led intentionalists to hold up con-
versational implicature, and indirect communicative acts more gener-
ally, as the most serious hurdle for conventionalist theories of commu-
nicative acts (Bach and Harnish 1979: §7.2).9 A signifi cant portion of 
9 Schiffer apparently took this objection to conventionalism to be so obvious 
and crushing that, in his 1972 book, Meaning, he decided that it needn’t be stated 
 D.W. Harris, Intentionalism versus The New Conventionalism 185
Imagination and Convention is devoted to three strategies for counter-
ing the argument from indirect communication, which I will now con-
sider, in turn.
4.1. The Conventional Defense
Lepore and Stone’s fi rst defense against the argument from indirect 
communication is to argue that many putative examples of indirect 
speech are in fact conventional. One way that Lepore and Stone do this is 
by arguing that many standard examples of indirect communication fail 
Grice’s own nondetachability test. They point out that it is much more 
natural to request french toast using (4) than with (7), for example.
(4) Can I have the french toast?⇝ Serve me the french toast.
(7) Am I able to have the French Toast?⇝ Serve me the french toast.
But, since (4) and (7) seem to be synonymous with respect to what we 
can literally and directly say with them, Lepore and Stone conclude that 
“English speakers somehow know that [(4)], rather than [(7)], is the ordi-
nary formulation of an indirect request” (2015). Lepore and Stone argue 
that, together with other data, the difference between (4) and (7) sup-
ports the conclusion that the indirect-request reading of (4) is built into 
the conventions of English. In a forthcoming paper, they show how this 
idea can be worked into a formal-semantic theory (Lepore and Stone, 
2017).
Lepore and Stone offer a similar argument about (5), comparing it to 
(8).
(5) Oil prices doubled and demand for consumer  goods plunged.⇝ The doubling preceded/caused the plunge.
(8) Oil prices have doubled and demand for consumer goods have 
plunged.⇝ The doubling preceded/caused the plunge.
Again, it would be much more natural to implicate that the doubling of 
oil prices preceded or caused the plunge in demand for consumer goods 
by uttering (5) than by uttering (8). Grice’s explanation for how speak-
ers communicate facts about the order of events described in a con-
junction is that they do so by exploiting the maxim of manner, which 
directs speakers to, among other things, “be orderly”. Grice seemed 
to think that describing events in an orderly way normally requires 
presenting them in the order in which they occurred. A speaker who 
explicitly, instead making (and thus illustrating) the objection indirectly by using 
the following example sentences to make an unrelated point  (1972: 94):
A: “A necessary condition of someone’s meaning that p is that he utter a 
sentence which means ‘p’.”
S: “But then one could never mean that p by uttering a sentence metaphorically.”
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utters (5) can thus normally be understood as implicating something 
about the order of the events they’re describing.10
But as Lepore and Stone point out, an utterance of (8) presents the 
same events in the same order, and yet the implicature that they oc-
curred in that order is far less natural. Again, Lepore and Stone take 
this to be evidence that something grammatical is responsible for the 
order effect communicated by (5), and they defend a dynamic-semantic 
treatment of the simple past in order to implement this idea (2015: 
ch.7).
With nondetachability out of the way, what about calculability and 
cancellability? Lepore and Stone simply deny that indirect readings 
are calculable in anything like Grice’s sense. They argue that we rely on 
language-specifi c information in order to work out what someone indi-
rectly means by (4)–(6), for example. And they have a nice explanation 
for why the indirect reading of (4), for example, is cancellable, which 
is that (4) is semantically ambiguous between a pure question reading 
and an indirect-request reading. What looks like the cancellation of an 
implicature—‘not that I want french toast, I’m just curious about the 
menu’—is actually a disambiguating clarifi cation.
I fi nd myself convinced by Lepore and Stone that the very natural 
indirect readings of (4) and (5) are more conventional than intentional-
ists have tended to think. But we must be careful about the big-picture 
lessons we draw from these arguments. And Lepore and Stone draw 
some very bold lessons from these and a few other case studies in 
conventionalizing indirect communication. They argue that indirect 
communicative acts, understood as communicative acts that must be 
interpreted by means of the kind of inferential processes posited by 
Grice, do not exist: “We have no use for a category of conversational 
implicatures, as traditionally and currently understood” (2015: 6).
Not so fast! A full defense of conventionalism against the argument 
from indirect communication would require giving a grammatical ac-
count of every purported example of indirect communication that in-
tentionalists can cook up. In order to achieve their grand philosophical 
goal of expunging implicature from the theory of communication, Lepore 
and Stone fi nd themselves in the always-tricky dialectical situation of 
having to defend a universal generalization one case at a time. Even if 
we accept their accounts of the examples they discuss in their book, 
there are always more examples.
In fact, I think we can use Lepore and Stone’s own examples, (7) and 
(8), against them. All that’s needed is to fi nd situations in which, for 
whatever reason, one of these sentences can be used to indirectly com-
municate in the relevant way. By fi lling in the surrounding context in 
the following way, I think we can accomplish thi s for (8):
10 Some more recent intentionalists have argued that enriched us es of ‘and’ are 
not best understood in terms of implicature. See, for example, Carston (2002: ch.3). 
These views are nonetheless incompatible with Lepore and Stone’s conventionalism, 
since they entail that the process by which ‘and’ is enriched is inferential.
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 Ernie is eating lunch with his friend Paul, who has a casual 
interest in economics. Ernie takes out his phone and glances at 
his stock app, looks distressed, a nd blurts out: “Darn! All of my 
stock in Samsung, Nike, and Proctor & Gamble has been tank-
ing!” Paul looks thoughtful for a moment and responds: “[It’s be-
cause of Iraq.]
(8) Oil prices have doubled and demand for consumer goods have 
plunged.⇝ The doubling caused the plunge.
In this case, I think the causal reading of ‘and’ is quite natural. But it is a 
premise in Lepore and Stone’s own argument for the conventional tem-
poral reading of (5) that there is no such conventional reading of (8). The 
reading in this particular context must therefore be an intention-based 
property, to be interpreted inferentially.
I think this point exposes a serious fl aw in Lepore and Stone’s meth-
odology and choice of examples. In choosing (4)–(6), Lepore and Stone 
build their arguments around examples that admit of indirect readings 
very naturally, and without situating them in detailed extralinguisic 
contexts. The indirect readings of these examples are so natural, in 
fact, that it shouldn’t be too surprising that they are good candidates 
for conventional treatments. It is natural to think of the indirect read-
ings of (4)–(6) along the lines of what Grice dubbed ‘generalized con-
versational implicatures’—cases in which “the use of a certain form of 
words in an utterance would normally (in the absence of special cir-
cumstances) carry such-and-such an implicature or type of implicature” 
(1989: 37). As Grice himself points out, “Noncontroversial examples are 
perhaps hard to fi nd, since it is all too easy to treat a generalized 
conversational implicature as if it were a conventional implicature” 
(1989: 37).
The really tough nuts for Lepore and Stone to crack will be what 
Grice called ‘particularized conversational implicatures’ and other high-
ly idiosyncratic indirect communicative acts that can be interpreted 
only due to highly specifi c features of the context in which they are 
performed. As the contextualized example of (8) that I’ve just given 
illustrates, indirect communicative acts of this kind can’t normally be 
detected simply by glancing at a numbered example and imagining up 
a stereotypical context in which they might have been uttered.
One way to see this would be to fi nd examples of sentences that, in 
different real-world contexts, cou ld be used to perform different indi-
rect communicative acts. An example:
(9) It’s 6AM.
First, imagine my wife uttering (9) as she wakes me up on a morning 
when I have to catch an 8:30 fl ight. In this context, it would be natural 
for me to interpret my wife as indirectly suggesting that I should get 
out of bed. Second, imagine my wife uttering (9) after emerging from 
188 D.W. Harris, Intentionalism versus The New Conventionalism
our bedroom on a morning when I’ve been up all night writing. In this 
context, it would be natural for me to interpret my wife as indirectly de-
manding an explanation for why I hadn’t slept. Third, imagine my wife 
uttering (9) as we hike up a mountain on a morning when, we both know, 
the sun is scheduled to rise behind us at 6:02. In this context, it would 
be natural for me to interpret my wife as indirectly informing me that 
the sun is about to come up. Clearly, none of these communicative acts 
is linked to (9) by the grammar of English. I need all sorts of background 
information in order to understand my wife in any of these three cases.
These particularlized indirect communicative acts, along with meta-
phorical utterances, fl atly-intoned but contextually obvious sarcasm 
and irony, and the like, make for the strongest case against Lepore and 
Stone’s big-picture conclusions. But this is where their next two defen-
sive strategies come into play.
4.2. The Imaginative Defense
Lepore and Stone’s second defense against the argument from indirect 
communication is to deny that many purported cases of indirect com-
municative acts are really communicative acts at all. This argument is 
perhaps most convincing as applied to certain metaphorical utterances, 
such as (10).
(10) Juliet is the sun.
What communicative act is Romeo performing when he utters (10)? As 
scholars of metaphor have long pointed out, it’s hard to say, because met-
aphors are hard to paraphrase. But as Lepore and Stone point out, this 
presents a serious problem for intentionalists who wish to claim that Ro-
meo is performing any communicative act at all by uttering (10). After all: 
in order to perform a communicative act, Romeo has to have a meaning 
intention of the kind posited by Grice. A meaning intention is an inten-
tion both (a) to produce a response (such as a belief in a certain proposi-
tion) in one’s addressee, and (b) to get them to recognize that one intends 
to produce this response. But if Romeo is trying to produce a belief in his 
addressee by uttering (10), it’s not going to be clear to them which belief 
this is. Communication  is therefore not likely to succeed. Moreover, it 
should be obvious to Romeo that this is the case. But intending to do 
something that you don’t think you can do is either impossible or just ir-
rational. It follows that it is either impossible or irrational for Romeo to 
have any sort of meaning intention in uttering (10), and that it is thereore 
impossible or irrational for him to perform a communicative act.
By generalizing this version of what Schiffer has dubbed the ‘mean-
ing-intention problem’ (Schiffer 1992, 1994), Lepore and Stone argue 
that a wide variety of purported indirect communicative acts, including 
those involving metaphor, sarcasm, irony, joking, hinting, insinuation, 
and various other apparent cases of implicature, cannot be commu-
nicative acts after all, since they can’t be backed by genuine meaning 
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intentions. Lepore and Stone argue, instead, that the speakers who 
produce these utterances are doing something that is rather different 
than attempting to communicate in the usual, Gricean sense.
…we argue that such utterances are better characterized as invitations to 
the audience to follow a specifi c direction of thought in exploring the con-
tributions of the utterance. This is the “Imagination” part of our title. The 
thinking involved is heterogeneous and diverse—it’s not just a circumscribed 
or uniform application of principles of rationality. And so, the insights inter-
locutors get by pursuing and appreciating this thinking also fall outside the 
scope of pragmatics as traditionally conceived. (Lepore and Stone 2015: 4–5)
In particular, Lepore and Stone argue that there’s no one right way to 
interpret metaphorical and other “imaginative” utterances, and so it 
doesn’t make sense to talk about communication either succeeding or 
failing when it comes to them. “Any conclusions the audience thereby 
discovers are implicit and tentative suggestions, rather than transpar-
ent and public contributions” (2015: 39).
Some of what they say suggests that Lepore and Stone would wish 
to apply this treatment even to my three examples of my wife uttering 
‘It’s 6AM’ in different contexts. Would she really be indirectly commu-
nicating with me in those cases, or simply pointing out the time and 
thereby inviting me to draw my own conclusions?
These considerations can be resisted in various ways. One is to insist 
that genuine communication can, at least sometimes, happen via meta-
phor and other unconventional indirect speech. One way to do this is 
to point out that even nebulously unparaphrasable of metaphors can 
be misinterpreted.11 Suppose, for example, that Juliet takes Romeo to 
have uttered (10) in order to imply that she is huge, gaseous, and dan-
gerous to get close to. Clearly, she will have misinterpreted Romeo’s ut-
terance. Similarly, if my wife awakes to fi nd me at the end of an all-night 
writing binge and utters (9), I will have misinterpreted her if I conclude 
that she was trying to congratulate me on my manic state. But the pos-
sibility of misinterpreting these acts can arise only if it also makes sense 
to talk about some interpretation (or a range of interpretations) as cor-
rect.
Another way to respond to Lepore and Stone’s argument is to point 
out that it overgenerates, since it consigns not only many purported in-
direct communicative acts to the imaginative waste bin, but also many 
seemingly perfectly good direct communicative acts as well. That the 
meaning-intention problem affects direct as well as indirect communi-
cative acts has been pointed out by Ray Buchanan, who imagines Chet 
addressing (11) to Tim before their party:
(11) Every beer is in the bucket. (Buchanan 2010: 347)
Clearly, Chet doesn’t mean that every beer in the universe is in the buck-
et; the quantifi er he expresses using the DP ‘every beer’ is restricted in 
11 This point is infl uenced by discussion with and unpublished work by Elisabeth 
Camp.
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some way. But how is it restricted? Does he mean that every beer in t he 
house is in the bucket, that every beer that Chet and Tim bought is in 
the bucket, that every beer that they planned to drink at the party is in 
the bucket, or something else? These are all equally good, non-equiva-
lent ways of restricting Chet’s quantifi er. But that means that there is 
no single candidate that Tim can reasonably take Chet to intend, and 
that means that Chet can’t reasonably intend for Tim to interpret him as 
meaning any of them.
This is the same problem raised by Lepore and Stone for meta-
phor, but now in the case of a much less mysterious-seeming utterance. 
Moreover, if the problem turns up here, we should expect to fi nd it all 
over the place: quantifi cational expressions of various kinds, including 
DPs, modals, conditionals, generics, adverbs, tense morphemes, and so 
on, are ubiquitous in natural language, and they are always, or nearly 
always, implicitly restricted. By parity of reasoning with Lepore and 
Stone’s conclusion that we don’t ever communicate with metaphor, should 
we conclude that we don’t ever genuinely communicate with quantifi ed 
sentences either?
Similar concerns apply to many other common expressions, includ-
ing possessives (‘my horse’), gradable adjectives (‘tall’), predicates of 
personal taste (‘delicious’), plural pronouns (‘we’), and so on. The leading 
semantic treatments of these expressions tell us that they install hidden 
variables in the LFs of sentences in which they appear, and that these 
variables must be “saturated by context” in order for those sentences 
to express propositions. But, as many others have argued (Bach 1987; 
King 2013, 2014; Neale 2004, 2005), it’s hard to see how anything but 
the intentions of the speaker could, in general, do the job of fi xing the 
values of these variables. The problem is that there will often be many 
non-equivalent candidate saturations that will seem equally natural to 
a hearer, and so none that a speaker can uniquely intend.
In short: if the meaning-intention problem establishes that we can’t 
communicate indirectly, then it also seems to establish that we almost 
never communicate directly either. But this is a dark path down which, 
I suspect, Lepore and Stone do not wish to lead us.
Luckily, Buchanan (2010) has a positive suggestion about how to 
respond to the meaning-intention problem. He argues that we should 
loosen the conditions on successful communication to some extent. The 
contents of communicative acts aren’t propositions, he suggests, but 
properties of propositions; for communication to succeed, a hearer need 
only come to believe that the speaker performed a communicative act 
whose content is some proposition or other with that property. Some as-
pects of this solution are underdeveloped—what is it about the speaker’s 
intentions or other mental states that determines exactly which prop-
erty they mean, for example?—but it seems to be a more promising fi rst 
step toward a solution than giving up on whole categories of communi-
cation altogether. Buchanan’s strategy also gives us an explanation of 
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how metaphorical communicative acts can be quite open-ended in the 
conditions of their correct interpretation, while at the same time having 
conditions of correct interpretation (and, so, misinterpretation).
Indeed, a careful reading of Grice reveals that he anticipated a ver-
sion of this problem as it applies to conversational implicature, as well 
as something in the neighborhood of Buchanan’s solution (if a bit more 
inchoate), and that he seemed untroubled by the issue.
Since, to calculate a conversational implicature is to calculate what has to 
be supposed in order to preserve the supposition that the Cooperative Prin-
ciple is being and there may be various possible specifi c explanations, a list 
of which may be open, the conversational implicatum in such cases will be 
disjunction of such specifi c explanations; and if the list of these is open, the 
implicatum will have just the kind of indeterminacy that many actual im-
plicata do in fact seem to possess. (1989: 39–40)
Like Buchanan, Grice seems to have thought communicative success 
does not require there to be a single, precise propositional content in-
tended by the speaker and recognized by the addressee. The idea that 
communication is about coordination in this strict sense is, at best, an 
idealization that Grice knowingly built into his model. Of course, it is 
an open question how intentionalists should lift this idealization, but I 
can’t think of a pressing reason to think that this can’t be done.
4.3. The Novelty Defense
Suppose that we resist letting Lepore and Stone toss every example of 
indirect communication into either the convention box or the imagina-
tion bin. Still, they have one more line of defense, which is to posit new 
conventions that we make up and acquire on the fl y.
Even in these cases [of non-conventional, indirect communication], however, 
we suspect that hearers must make an intuitive guess about a conventional-
ized indirect speech act, and so the listener’s inference lacks the content of a 
Gricean calculation. On the ambiguity view, the question to ask 
(106)  What is a plausible convention that I could postulate to assign this 
   utterance a likely intended interpretation?
It’s not the Gricean question (107).
(107)  How do principles of rationality and collaboration explain the creative 
   use to which the speaker has put this utterance with its known inter-
   pretation? (2015: 105)
My fi rst reaction to this defense of conventionalism is that it is ad hoc. 
To cover just those situations that can’t be explained by appeal to pre-ex-
isting conventions, Lepore and Stone argue that we should simply posit 
new ones. Although I think this initial worry holds some force, I don’t 
think that it is the best reason to be suspicious of the novelty defense.
The best reason, I think, is that the defense simply replaces one 
inferential task—that of answering (107)—with another, equivalent, in-
ferential task—that of answering (106). Indeed, answering these two 
questions will require roughly the same information and the same sorts 
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of inferences. After all: a convention is an arbitrary pairing of utterance-
types with communicative-act types. Learning a new convention on the 
fl y is therefore a matter of being presented with an utterance and, with-
out prior knowledge of the convention, fi guring out what kind of commu-
nicative act is being performed with it. But this is indistinguishable 
from the task of simply interpreting the communicative act inferential-
ly. In particular, since the fact that a given convention is operative is 
itself grounded in the speaker’s intention to make it operative—a point 
I argued in §3—inferring that a given convention is operative is a ki nd of 
intention recognition. I will return to this criticism in §6.
In any case, it looks as though we’ve found another inferential task, 
aside from disambiguation, that regularly fi gures in the interpretation 
of communicative acts, thus contradicting Lepore and Stone’s claim that 
“Pragmatics can be, at most, a theory of disambiguation; pragmatic rea-
soning never contributes content to utterances” (2015: 83). Acquiring 
a new convention on the fl y is not the same thing as disambiguating 
between two conventions that one has already acquired. Right?
I am worried that Lepore and Stone might try to resist this point. 
They might reply that, after all, disambiguation and on-the-fl y conven-
tion acquisition are both a matter of fi guring out which convention is at 
work in a given communicative act. Convention acquisition, they might 
insist, is just total disambiguation—disambiguation from an indefi nitely 
long list of meanings. I won’t protest if Lepore and Stone want to use 
the word ‘disambiguation’ in this way,12 but in that case I think that 
their distinction between disambiguation and “pragmatic reasoning” 
that “contributes content to utterances” is no longer an interesting one. 
As I have just pointed out, after all, interpreting a communicative con-
vention by acquiring a new convention on the fl y is approximately the 
same task, requiring approximately the same sorts of inferences, as 
simply interpreting the communicative act using intention recognition.
5. Unconventional Communication
A consequence of Lepore and Stone’s position is that it entails the im-
possibility of communication by unconventional means. The only genu-
ine communicative acts, they argue, are those performed with the aid 
of conventions. Everything else is an invitation to an imaginative jam 
session where there are no right or wrong answers.
The idea that there is no genuinely unconventional communication 
runs counter to the whole spirit of the intentionalist project as outlined 
in Grice’ s work. Grice used the labels ‘utterer’s meaning’ and ‘nonnatural 
meaning’ for the central concept in his theory of communication—what 
I have been calling ‘performing a communicative act’.13 This concept is 
12 Hey look: I’ve just acquired a new convention!
13 Strictly speaking, ‘nonnatural meaning’ is broader in scope than utterer’s 
meaning, since it also includes utterance-type meaning and utterance-occasion 
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now usually called ‘speaker meaning’, but that label is misleading: Grice 
wanted his theory to apply to nonlinguistic and linguistic communica-
tion alike, and he took essentially the same psychological mechanisms 
to be at the core of both phenomena. Grice used ‘utterance’ in a techni-
cal sense, “as a neutral word to apply to any candidate for [non-natural 
meaning]” (1989: 216). In other words: any behavior that might be pro-
duced for communicative purposes could be an utterance—an act of pro-
nouncing a sentence, sure, but also a gesture, a raised eyebrow, the act 
of passive-aggressively doing the dishes, or just the right dance move. 
Grice’s broad use of ‘utterance’ is illustrated by his choice of examples of 
non-natural meaning (“meaningNN”) in his 1957 article, ‘Meaning’—the 
original articulation of the intentionalist project:
(G1) Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that the bus is 
full. (1989: 214)
(G2) That remark, ‘Smith couldn’t get along without his trouble and 
strife’, meant that Smith found his wife indispensable. (1989: 
214)
(G3) I draw a picture of Mr. Y [displaying undue familiarity to Mrs. X] 
and show it to Mr. X. …[T]he picture (or my drawing and showing 
it) meantNN something (that Mr. Y had been unduly familiar), 
or at least that I had meantNN by it that Mr. Y had been unduly 
familiar. (1989: 218)
(G4) If I frown deliberately (to convey my displeasure), an onlooker 
may be expected, provided he recognizes my intention, …to con-
clude that I am displeased. [Grice goes on to argue that this 
case counts as meaningNN provided that the frowner intends the 
addressee to conclude that the frowner is displeased via the rec-
ognition of the frowner’s intention.] (1989: 219)
(G5) If…I had pointed to the door or given him a little push, then 
my behavior might well be held to constitute a meaningfulNN 
utterance, just because the recognition of my intention would be 
intended by me to be effective in speeding his departure. (1989: 
220)
(G6) …a policeman who stops a car by waving. (1989: 220)
(G7) …if I cut someone in the street, I do feel inclined to assimilate this 
to the cases of meaningNN, and this inclination seems to me de-
pendent on the fact that I would not reasonably expect him to 
be distressed (indignant, humiliated) unless he recognized my 
intention to affect him in this way. (1989: 220)
(G8) If my college stopped my salary altogether, I should accuse them 
of ruining me; if they cut it by one pound, I might accuse them 
of insulting me [This example immediately follows the previous 
one, and the implication is that the latter case is an example of 
meaningNN.] (1989: 220)
meaning. But Grice often speaks of ‘nonnatural meaning’ when he’s talking  about 
utterer’s meaning, including in the examples discussed below.
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Of these examples, only (G2) is involves a linguistic utterance, and only 
(G1), (G4), and (G6) are plausibly conventional in nonlinguistic ways. 
Even (G4) and (G6) don’t seem to be essentially conventional. If there 
were no convention of deliberately frowning in order to convey displea-
sure in my community, it seems likely that the non-conventional rela-
tionship between involuntary frowning and displeasure would allow 
one to communicate displeasure via an obviously deliberate frown, 
given the right context. Likewise, it is possible to imagine the police-
man in example (6) getting his point across by waving in a hitherto-
unconventional way, given the right circumstances.
The fact that Grice uses examples of communicative acts that 
(mostly) don’t involve language or conventions is not an accident. In 
justifying his distinction between natural and nonnatural meaning, 
for example, Grice argues that it does a better job of capturing “what 
people are getting at when they display an interest in a distinction be-
tween ‘natural’ and ‘conventional’ signs”, in part because “some things 
which can meanNN something…are not conventional in a ny ordinary 
sense” (1989: 215). What Grice’s examples share is just that they are all 
intelligible ways, in their respective contexts, of providing the addressee 
with evidence of the speaker’s intentions. Although it may often be 
easiest to provide this evidence by exploiting conventions, there are 
sometimes other ways that will work well enough. Grice’s theory posits 
the same underlying psychological mechanisms to explain both conven-
tion-aided and unconventional cases of communication.
What can Lepore and Stone say about Grice’s examples—in partic-
ular, the clearly unconventional cases: (G3), (G5), (G7), and (G8)? It 
seems to me that they have two options: either these aren’t genuine 
communicative acts, or they involve the on-the-fl y creation and acquisi-
tion of novel conventions. I don’t like either of these options—the latter 
for reasons that I touched on in §4.3 and that I will address in greater 
detail in §6, and the former for reasons that I will briefl y take up here.
My main problem with the thesis that we don’t communicate in un-
conventional ways is that this idea doesn’t fi t with what we know about 
the human appetite and aptitude for mindreading. Our drive to take 
the intentional stance toward the world around us—to interpret and 
predict others’ actions in terms of what’s going on in their minds—is 
so constant and routine that it may be easy not to notice the enormous 
role that it plays in our lives. But try reading a newspaper or a novel, or 
watching a movie, without attributing beliefs and intentions to the real 
or fi ctional agents in the stories. Try planning dinner, going shopping, 
caring for children, conducting market research, negotiating a cease-
fi re, or designing public policy without a constant and mostly reliable 
stream of information about the mental states of those around you. If 
our mindreading abilities were all suddenly switched off, things would 
get ugly fast.
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This is because the ability to attribute mental states to others and 
to oneself— including higher-order mental states—is the basic capacity 
required for any sort of intelligent social interaction. Some have argued 
that the capacity for mindreading and the social intelligence that came 
with it are the central functions for which human brains evolved to be 
so large and costly in the fi rst place (Dunbar 1998, 2003). Others have 
argued that the capacity for mindreading was an essential precondi-
tion for the evolution of language (Scott-Phillips 2014). Whether or not 
those theses are true, a great deal of evidence has recently emerged to 
support the view that mindreading is an innate capacity in humans—
one that develops in all neurotypical humans in early infancy.14 The 
ability to detect others’ beliefs and distinguish them from one’s own 
has been observed in children as young as ten months (Luo 2011), for 
example, and the ability to attribute intentions to agents in order to 
explain their behavior has been observed in infants as young as three 
months—an age below which we don’t have any viable experimental 
paradigms because infants’ muscles and eyesight aren’t suffi ciently 
developed (Sommerville et al. 2005).15 Intention-recognition is thus 
among the earliest higher cognitive capacities to come online in ba-
bies—a fact that is perhaps unsurprising, given that getting over many 
other developmental hurdles requires infants to engage in socially in-
telligent ways with others.
I doubt that Lepore and Stone would fi nd much to disagree with in 
this mixture of platitudes and well-supported cognitive science. But 
they seem not to appreciate the consequences of it. Interpretive infer-
ences of the sort posited by Grice to explain both linguistic and nonlin-
guistic communication is just a special case of the same old mindread-
ing in which we continuously and refl exively engage as we interact with 
other agents. Specifi cally, it is the special case that arises when our 
already-hyperactive drive to read agents’ minds is intentionally initi-
ated and guided by the very agents whose minds we’re already trying 
to read. But, surely, an interpretive capacity that we engage in with 
such frequency and success does not become deeply mysterious just 
when the very people we’re trying to interpret shape their own behavior 
with the goal of making it easier for us.
Lepore and Stone might try to respond by arguing that Grice posits 
a special kind of mindreading in his theory of implicature, so that 
we can’t show that Gricean explanations make sense just by showing 
that there’s nothing mysterious about intentionally getti ng someone to 
read one’s mind. In their discussion of Grice, they tend to focus on the 
fact that implicatures are supposed to be interpreted by relying on the 
14 For an excellent summary of this evidence, see Carey (2009).
15 Intentions are commonly referred to as ‘goals’ in the psychological literature. 
Some have argued that the states that infants attribute are not quite beliefs and 
intentions but simpler counterparts of those states (Butterfi ll and Apperly 2013), but 
Carey presents evidence that can’t be accounted for by this sort of “minimal” model 
of infant mindreading (2009, 166–170).
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Cooperative Principle and the maxims. Toward the end of the book, 
they summarize what they take themselves to have proven as follows, 
for example.
There are no special meanings, over and above the meanings of our utter-
ances, that interlocutors infer by calculation from a Cooperative Principle, 
maxims of conversation, or other general principles for pragmatic enrichment 
and reinterpretation. (2015: 199)
But the idea that pragmatic inference is guided the Cooperative Princi-
ple does not make it a uniquely mysterious form of mindreading. Rather, 
the Cooperative Principle is just a natural assumption for me to make 
as an addressee, given the assumption that the speaker is actively try-
ing, in good faith, to trigger and guide my instinct to read their mind. 
If I make this assumption about a speaker, and if the speaker makes 
the analogous assumption that I am attempting in good faith to recog-
nize their thoughts, then we’re acting in accordance with something like 
the Cooperative Principle. This isn’t to say that we must always act in 
accordance with it; sometimes we know that a hearer is being willfully 
obtuse, for example. But of course, these are precisely the occasions on 
which indirect communication tends to fail.
This broad line of thought gives us a very powerful reason to reject 
Lepore and Stone’s view that most apparent examples of indirect and 
unconventional communication are actually mere invitations to mere 
imaginative refl ection. It also gives us a new reason to be suspicious of 
the argument that Lepore and Stone use to defend that view. In particu-
lar, if we think of communication as nothing more than deliberately 
triggered mindreading, we fi nd further reason to accept the idea, which 
I advocated at the end of §4.2, that communicative success often doesn’t 
require the the speaker and addressee to coordinate on a single, precise 
propositional content. After all: mindreading is hardly ever that precise, 
and yet we don’t conclude that it is mysterious or impossible. But if com-
municating with someone is just a matter of intentionally triggering and 
guiding the same mindreading capacity they’re using the rest of the 
time, it shouldn’t be surprising if communication involves the same sort 
of slack as mindreading.
6. Convention Acquisition
Finally, I would like to consider the question of how we acquire lin-
guistic conventions in the fi rst place. Conventions are pairings of types 
of actions (in our case, types of communicative acts) with ways of per-
forming them (in our case, types of utterances). The task of acquiring 
a new convention for how to ϕ is a matter of somehow coordinating on 
a new way, ψ, of ϕing. But every story about convention-acquisition that 
I know of involves the following steps.16
16 Cf. Schiffer 1972: §5.1; Lewis 1969; Skyrms 1996, 2010; Millikan 1998, 2005; 
Hume 1738: §3.2.2
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(i) Agents begin by ϕing in unconventional ways.
(ii) Somehow, out of the chaos, a pattern of ϕing by ψing emerges, 
at fi rst for arbitrary or idiosyncratic reasons.
(iii) The pattern becomes increasingly standardized and self-reinforc-
ing.
(iv)  Finally, a convention of ϕing by ψing has come into being.
The problem for Lepore and Stone, is that this abstract story entails that 
for any convention of ϕing by ψing to develop in the fi rst place, it has to be 
possible to perform at least some rudimentary acts of ϕing in an uncon-
ventional way. It follows that no kind of action that has gradually come 
to be governed by conventions can be essentially conventional, and this 
includes communicative acts.
This reinforces a point that I made in §4.3. Lepore and Stone explic-
itly argue that convention-acquisition is an important step in many in-
stances of communication. Although I disagree with their idea that we 
have anything to gain by holding that convention acquisition should be 
posited in place of all of the other inferential processes involved in in-
terpretation (other than disambiguation), I do think that there are good 
reasons to think that linguistic conventions are constantly being renego-
tiated during conversations, and that being an effective communicator of-
ten involves acquiring new conventions on the fl y. Indeed, much recent 
work in the philosophy of language has hammered home the degree to 
which linguistic conventions are constantly being renegotiated (Arm-
strong 2016; Barker 2002; Ludlow 2014; Plunkett and Sundell 2013). 
But as I argued in §4.3, the process of acquiring a new linguistic con-
vention is a mindreading task of just the kind that Lepore and Stone 
wish to expunge from their theory of communication. Figuring out that 
you are using an unfamiliar expression with the intention of engaging 
in a convention on which it means XYZ is no more straightforward than 
inferring, without the aid of any prior knowledge of the relevant conven-
tions, that you mean XYZ in using the expression.
These points about convention acquisition are backed up by empiri-
cal evidence about language acquisition in children. For example, after 
surveying the literature on the role played by mindreading in word 
learning, Paul Bloom concludes that, provided we bracket the paral-
lel task of acquiring concepts, “learning the meaning of a word just 
reduces to intentional inference; once we know how children divine the 
intentions of others, there is nothing left to explain” (2000). In a simi-
lar vein, Shevaun Lewis, Valentine Hacquard, Jeffrey Lidz, and their 
colleagues have developed a sophisticated and empirically supported 
model of the acquisition of the meanings of attitude verbs on which the 
model’s inputs are the child’s innate knowledge of syntax together with 
their ability to work out speaker meanings (Hacquard 2014; Lewis 2013; 
Lewis et al., MS).
These fi ndings confi rm that intention recognition is developmen-
tally, and so explanatorily, prior to the use of linguistic conventions in 
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communication, and they give us strong reasons to conclude that the 
interpretation of communicative acts needn’t be guided by knowledge 
of conventions.
Aside from pointing to confi rmed cases where unadulterated inten-
tion recognition is involved in interpreting communicative acts, and 
thereby further bolstering my argument in §5, these considerations 
should take the wind out of what I have called Lepore and Stone’s 
‘imaginative defense’ of conventionalism (§4.2). If it is sometimes pos-
sible to successfully interpret communicative acts without the aid of 
convention—and it has to be, given that we acquire conventions in the 
fi rst place—then the problem of inferring the properties of indirect com-
municative acts can’t be as bad as Lepore and Stone’s version of the mean-
ing-intention problem might seem to suggest.
Conclusion
When presented with a property, ϕ, of a communicative act, α, that 
seems not to be conventional, Lepore and Stone reply in one of three 
ways:
THE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE: ϕ is really conventional after all (§4.1).
THE IMAGINATIVE DEFENSE: α is not really a communicative act, but an 
invitation to engage in imaginative refl ection with no right or 
wrong answers (§4.2).
THE NOVELTY DEFENSE: Hearers interpret α as having ϕ by positing a 
novel convention on the fl y (§4.3).
I have tried to rebut these strategies for defending conventionalism in 
several ways.
First, I have argued that each of these defenses fails on its own terms. 
Although the examples that Lepore and Stone discuss in mounting the 
conventional defense may be susceptible to conventionalist treatment, 
other examples can’t. Lepore and Stone’s argument for the imaginative 
defense overgenerates, consigning numerous instances of perfectly good 
communication to the imaginative waste bin. Moreover, it rests on the 
dubious premises, rejected by Grice and at least some contemporary in-
tentionalists, that communication has to be precise in order to succeed. 
And, in deploying the novelty defense, Lepore and Stone conclude, in 
effect, that many cases of communication involve an inferential process 
(convention acquisition) that isn’t relevantly different from the kind of 
Gricean intention recognition that they wish to expunge from the theory 
of communication.
Second, I have argued that Lepore and Stone’s three defensive strate-
gies are in tension with one another. Since acquiring a new convention 
on the fl y is essentially the same task as interpreting a communicative 
act without the aid of convention, and Lepore and Stone think that we 
regularly do the former, they are also committed to the possibility of do-
ing the latter. But if this is so, then the imaginative defense can’t work, 
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since it is designed to show that we can’t interpret unconventional com-
municative acts.
I conclude that although Lepore and Stone’s treatments of particular 
semantic and pragmatic phenomena are fascinating and possibly cor-
rect, their broader defense of conventionalism in the philosophy of lan-
guage is not one about which we should be optimistic.
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